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Abstract
On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) a pandemic. With
limited supplies of antivirals and vaccines, countries and individuals are looking at other ways to reduce the spread of
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, particularly options that are cost effective and relatively easy to implement. Recent experiences with
the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 epidemics have shown that people are willing to wear facemasks to protect themselves
against infection; however, little research has been done to quantify the impact of using facemasks in reducing the spread
of disease. We construct and analyze a mathematical model for a population in which some people wear facemasks during
the pandemic and quantify impact of these masks on the spread of influenza. To estimate the parameter values used for the
effectiveness of facemasks, we used available data from studies on N95 respirators and surgical facemasks. The results show
that if N95 respirators are only 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity, only 10% of the population would
have to wear them to reduce the number of influenza A (H1N1) cases by 20%. We can conclude from our model that, if worn
properly, facemasks are an effective intervention strategy in reducing the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
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Introduction
Novel influenza A (H1N1) (hereafter referred to as pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 in keeping with the World Health Organization
(WHO) nomenclature) is a new flu virus of swine, avian, and
human origin that was first identified in mid-April 2009 in Mexico
and the United States [1]. The virus soon spread to the rest of the
world and on June 11, 2009 the WHO declared novel influenza A
(H1N1) a pandemic. The virus continues to spread, with most
countries reporting cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 [1]. Even
though the WHO’s declaration of a phase six pandemic alert level
does not explicitly refer to the severity of the disease, as many
people contracting the virus recover without medical treatment,
the number of deaths continues to rise [1]. The rapid spread of
influenza, due to its short incubation period and lack of strain-
specific vaccine, pose a challenge to the implementation of
effective mitigation strategies during the expected reemergence of
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the fall/winter flu season. Every year
approximately 36,000 people die from seasonal influenza or flu-
related causes in the U.S. [2]. However, the number of casualties
may increase with a new and more virulent strains of influenza,
such as the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
The emergence of an unexpected or new strain of influenza means
there are no prepared vaccines and the existing antivirals may be
ineffective in combating the spread of infection. Vaccination is typically
the first line of defense against influenza viruses [3]. The entire vaccine
production process takes at least six months to complete [4] and al-
though a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine became available in the U.S.
in October 2009, there are severe shortages in the amount of vaccines
available. Another concern is that the currently circulating H1N1 strain
could mutate, making the vaccine ineffective or less effective.
In the recent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, non-pharma-
ceutical interventions such as school closings and thermal
screenings at airports were implemented to slow the spread of
disease [5,6]. Other common non-pharmecuetical interventions
include quarantine, isolation, travel restrictions, closing of public
places, fear-based self quarantine, and cancellation of events.
These interventions all have economic costs to individuals and
society related to lost work, increased school absenteeism, and
decreased business revenues.
Another non-pharmaceutical option is the use of facemasks. In
the 2003 SARS outbreak many individuals used facemasks to
reduce their chances of contracting infection. In Hong Kong 76%
of the residents reported using masks during the 2003 SARS
epidemic [7]. Even though individuals have taken upon themselves
to wear facemasks during disease outbreaks, little research has
been done to quantify the impact of the use of facemasks during an
epidemic. Mathematical models of the spread of infectious disease
can be useful in assessing the impact of facemasks on reducing the
spread of a disease, specifically pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 spreads through person-to-person
contact, airborne particles, coughing and sneezing, and by
fomites [1], therefore, the use of facemasks is a logical line of
defense. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
have interim recommendations on the use of facemasks and
respirators for the current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. The
CDC defines the term facemask as a disposable mask cleared by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use as a
medical device, such as surgical masks. Surgical masks are
designed to help stop droplets from being spread by the person
wearing the mask, not to protect against breathing in very small
particle aerosols that may contain viruses [8]. We will use of the
term ‘respirator’ for an N95 or higher filtering facepiece
respirator certified by the CDC/National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH); a respirator is designed to
protect the person wearing the mask against breathing in very
small particles that may contain viruses [8]. The CDC states that
the effectiveness of the use of facemasks and respirators in various
settings is unknown and do not generally recommend the use of
facemasks or respirators in home or community settings nor in
non-medical occupational settings [8]. In certain circumstances
the CDC recommends the use of masks for individuals who are at
high risk of infection and cannot avoid situations with potential
exposure to the disease [8].
There have been a handful of studies that have analyzed the
effectiveness of facemasks against nanoparticles in the size range
of viruses using manikin-based protocol in which the masks were
sealed on the manikin’s face so that no leakage would occur
[9–11]. All three studies show similar results in penetration
percentage for the N95 respirator. The high fit N95 respirator
had penetration percentages from about 0.5% to 2.5% at 30 l/
min and from about 0.5% to 5% at 85 l/min [9–11]. The low fit
N95 respirator had penetration percentages from about 1.5% to
3.5% at 30 l/min and from about 1.5% to 6% at 85 l/min
[9–11]. The surgical masks tested in Balazy et al.’s [10] study
show a much greater penetration percentage. At 30 l/min one
model of surgical mask (SM1) allowed 20–80% of particles to
penetrate the mask, while another model (SM2) allowed 2–15%
[10]. At 85 l/min SM1 allowed penetration of 30–85% of
particles while SM2 allowed 5–21% [10]. The N95 respirator in
a sealed manikin test seems to be fairly effective against
nanoparticles, almost holding up to its 95% certification. The
surgical masks are not as effective, allowing a much greater
percentage of particles to pass through to the wearer even when
sealed tightly to a manikin.
Unfortunately, this type of testing does not provide an accurate
estimate of the level of protection for everyday use of a mask by a
person. While these studies provide data on the actual protection
of masks against nanoparticles in a perfect setting, it does not take
into consideration that a mask will not be completely sealed on an
individual nor will it fit perfectly. Furthermore, one must consider
that an individual will not always be wearing the mask, for
example, a mask will be taken off to eat and sleep, or possibly
because it becomes uncomfortable to wear.
Lee et al. [12] performed a study on N95 respirators and
surgical masks using human subjects. The challenge aerosol used
was NaCl, with particles in the size range of bacteria and viruses
(.04–1.3mm). They tested four models of N95 respirators: 1) high
protection level, 2) medium protection level, 3) exhalation valve,
and 4) exhalation without valve and three models of surgical
masks: 1) high protection level, 2) medium protection level, and 3)
low protection level. The results from the study showed that the
lowest protection offered from N95 respirators is when particles
are in the size range of 0.08–0.2mm and for surgical masks when
particles are in the size range of 0.04–0.32mm. The size range of
influenza virus is in the range of 0.08–0.12mm, which falls into
both masks most penetrating particle size range. The N95
respirator was found to be 21.5% effective and the surgical mask
was 2.4% effective in protecting against nanoparticles. The N95
respirator provides approximately nine times greater protection
than a surgical mask and is clearly a better option in protecting
against infection.
A University of Michigan School of Public Health study led by
Dr. Allison Aiello [13] is evaluating the effectiveness of hand-
washing and facemasks in preventing influenza from spreading.
The study, called M-FLU, conducted a randomized cluster
intervention trial among students living in dorm housing. The
students were randomly separated into two intervention groups,
one wearing masks and practicing hand hygiene, one just wearing
masks, and also in a control group. The study was carried out over
the 2006–2007 influenza season, which was a mild season. The
study found that facemasks and hand hygiene were correlated with
a 35–51% reduction in influenza-like illness [13].
There are many factors that influence people’s willingness to
wear a mask. In a study by Tang and Wong [14] a total of 1,329
Table 1. State Variables for the Model.
Variable Definition
S Number of Susceptible Individuals Not Wearing a Mask
Sm Number of Susceptible Individuals Wearing a Mask
E Number of Exposed Individuals Not Wearing a Mask
Em Number of Exposed Individuals Wearing a Mask
I Number of Infected Individuals Not Wearing a Mask
Im Number of Infected Individuals Wearing a Mask
R Number of Recovered Individuals
D Number of Dead Individuals
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t001
Figure 1. Schematic relationship between mask wearing
individuals and non-mask wearing individuals for pandemic
(H1N1) 2009. The arrows that connect the boxed groups represent
the movement of individuals from one group to an adjacent one. Non-
mask wearing susceptible individuals (S) can either become exposed (E)
or susceptible wearing a mask (Sm). Non-mask wearing exposed
individuals (E) can either become infectious non-mask wearing (I) or
mask wearing exposed (Em). Non-mask wearing infectious individuals (I)
can either recover (R), die (D), or become infectious wearing a mask (Im).
Mask wearing susceptible individual (Sm) can either become an
exposed mask wearer (Em) or a non-mask wearing susceptible (S).
Mask wearing exposed individuals (Em) can either become an infectious
mask wearer (Im) or a non-mask wearing exposed individual (E). A mask
wearing infectious individual (Im) can either recover (R), die (D), or stop
wearing the mask while they are still infectious (I).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g001
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use of facemasks during the 2003 SARS epidemic. Overall
61.2% of the respondents reported the consistent use of
facemasks to prevent contracting the disease. The study found
that women in the age group 50–59 and married respondents
were more likely to wear facemasks, suggesting that the
aesthetics of wearing a facemask may be a concern. Also, the
study found that individuals who had a university education or
earned more than US$5,000 per month were more likely to
wear a mask. Tang and Wong also showed that perceived
susceptibility, cues to action, and perceived benefits, were
significant predictors in whether or not an individual consis-
tently wore a mask.
Methods
Following the approached developed in [15], the population
is divided into two subgroups: a mask wearing group (subscript
m) and a non-mask wearing group. People move back and forth
between the mask and non-mask groups based on the number
of individuals infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Individuals
in each activity group are characterized by their epidemiolog-
ical status: susceptible, denoted by S and Sm,e x p o s e d ,d e n o t e d
by E and Em (i.e., people who are infected but not yet fully
contagious), and infectious individuals, I and Im. Definitions of
the eight epidemiological classes are summarized in Table 1
and the transfers are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.
Because we are evaluating the effectiveness of masks in a single
influenza period, we use a closed system with no migration in or
out, and births and natural deaths are not included in the
model.
As seen in Figure 1, the transfer rates of people from the
exposed classes, E and Em, to the infectious classes, I and Im, are
vE and vEm. Infectious individuals can move to group D, at rate
mI and mIm, when they die from infection or to group R, at rate dI
and dIm, upon recovery. The mean times in the infectious classes, I
and Im, are 1=(dzm). Hence, the infectious fraction d=(mzd)
recovers and the infectious fraction m=(mzd) dies as a conse-
quence of this disease.
Table 2. Parameter Definitions and Values.
Parameter Description Units Baseline Range Reference
N Total Population People 1 million 0–300 million See text
<unc Effective Reproduction Number (uncontrolled) 1 1.83 0–2 [16,24–26,33]
b Transmission Rate 1 0.23 0–1 [27–29]
v Incubation Relative Rate Day{1 1
6
0–1 [18]
m Death Relative Rate Day{1 0.001 0–1 [25,26,34–36]
d Recovery Relative Rate Day{1 0.2 0–1 [20]
h Reduced Number of Contacts Due To Illness 1 1 0–1 [28]
a Reduced Infectiousness Due to Incubation 1 0.5 0–1 [19,31]
gs (N95) Decrease in Susceptibly because of Mask 1 0.20 0–1 [12]
gi (N95) Decrease in Infectivity because of Mask 1 0.5 0–1 [12]
gs (SM) Decrease in Susceptibly because of Mask 1 0.02 0–1 [12]
gi (SM) Decrease in Infectivity because of Mask 1 0.05 0–1 [12]
Qi Movement Rate Between Classes 1 See text 0–1 See text
i=S, Sm, E, Em, I, Im
t Number of Infecteds at which Mask are Implemented People 100 100–10000 See text
I/N Initially Infected Fraction of the Population 1 0.00001 0–1 See text
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t002
Table 3. Percentage of the Number of Cumulative Cases in a Population of 1 Million: N95 Respirators.
N95 Respirator Effectiveness Percentage of Population Wearing N95 Respirators
Susceptible (gs gs gs gs) Infectious (gi gi gi gi) 10% 25% 50%
gs~0, gi~0 74.61 74.61 74.61
gs~0:2, gi~0:2 55.39 45.56 38.09
gs~0:2, gi~0:5 11.92 0.81 0.30
gs~0:5, gi~0:5 0.94 0.18 0.10
Percentage of the number of cumulative cases in a population of one million for varying percentages of population wearing N95 respirators and varying mask
effectiveness for susceptibles (gs) and infectious (gi). Notice that as a higher percentage of people wear masks there is a lower percentage of cumulative cases. Also, as
mask effectiveness increases the percentage of cases goes down.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t003
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groups and that contact activity levels remain normal
throughout the epidemic. We define t0 as the beginning of
the epidemic. Movement of individuals between mask and
non-mask groups depends upon the number of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 cases in the population. A specified percentage of
the population starts wearing masks as the number of infected
people increases.
We define QSmS, QEmE, and QImI to be the transfer rates
from the S, E, and I classes to the Sm, Em,a n dIm classes,
respectively, similarly QSSm, QEEm,a n dQIIm are the transfer
rates from the Sm, Em,a n dIm classes to the S, E, and I classes,
respectively.
The rate coefficients are modeled by step-functions of the
number of infectious individuals:
Qi~
ai 0ƒIzImƒt
bi tvIzIm
 
ð1Þ
for i=S, E, I, Sm, Em, and Im. Here the parameters a and b are
positive constants that determine the rate of movement and t is the
number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases that determines when
masks are implemented. For i=S, E, and I, bi is set at 0.1 or 10%
of the population.
Using the transfer diagrams in Figure 1 we obtain the following
system of differential equations:
dS
dt
~{(QSmzl)SzQSSm
dE
dt
~{(QEmzv)EzQEEmzlS
dI
dt
~{(QImzdzm)IzQIImzvE
dSm
dt
~{(QSzlm)SmzQSmS
dEm
d
~{(QEzv)EmzQEmEzlmSm
dIm
dt
~{(QIzdzm)ImzQImIzvEm
dR
dt
~d(IzIm)
dD
dt
~m(IzIm)
ð2Þ
Here l (non-mask group) and lm (mask group) are the forces of
infection and lS and lmSm are the transfer rates from the
susceptible classes, S and Sm, to the exposed classes, E and Em.
The infection rates, l and lm, incorporate the probability of
transmission per contact, b, the reduced infectiousness due to
incubation, a, the reduced number of contacts because of
symptomatic infection, h, and 1{gj,( j=s or i), which accounts
for the effectiveness of the mask in reducing either susceptibility
(gs) or infectivity (gi). The transmissibility, b, is defined as the
Table 4. Percentage of the Number of Cumulative Cases in a Population of 1 Million: Surgical Masks.
Surgical Mask Effectiveness Percentage of Population Wearing Surgical Masks
Susceptible (gs gs gs gs) Infectious (gi gi gi gi) 10% 25% 50%
gs~0, gi~0 74.61 74.61 74.61
gs~0:02, gi~0:02 73.13 72.68 72.34
gs~0:02, gi~0:05 71.85 71.12 70.49
gs~0:05, gi~0:05 70.75 69.40 68.55
Percentage of the number of cumulative cases in a population of one million for varying percentages of population wearing surgical masks and varying mask
effectiveness for susceptibles (gs) and infectious (gi). Notice that as a higher percentage of people wear masks there is a lower percentage of cumulative cases. Also, as
mask effectiveness increases the percentage of cases goes down. Note surgical masks do not decrease the percentage of the number of cases as greatly as N95
respirators.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t004
Table 5. Effective Reproduction Number, <con: N95 Respirator.
Respirator Effectiveness Effective Reproduction Number, <con
Susceptible (gs gs gs gs) Infectious (gi gi gi gi) 10% 25% 50%
gs~0, gi~0 1.83 1.83 1.83
gs~0:2, gi~0:2 1.66 1.6 1.56
gs~0:2, gi~0:5 1.4 1.26 1.16
gs~0:5, gi~0:5 1.4 1.26 1.16
Effective Reproduction Number <con for N95 respirators. Notice that <con decreases as a higher percentage of people wear masks as well as when masks are more
effective. <con is greatly reduced when 50% of the population wears masks and masks are 50% effective.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t005
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disease multiplied by the average number of contacts an individual
has per day. The definitions of the parameters are summarized in
Table 2. The forces of infection for the non-mask group and mask
group are shown by:
l~b
hIzaE
r
)z(1{gi)(
hImzaEm
r
     
lm~b (1{gs)
hIzaE
r
  
z(1{gi)(1{gs)
hImzaEm
r
     
ð3Þ
where r~N{(1{h)(IzIm) and N is the total population
(SzSmzEzEmzIzImzR).I nt h ef o r c eo fi n f e c t i o n ,( 1 - gi)
multiplies the hIm/r and aEm/r infectious fractions because
individuals in the Im and Em classes are wearing masks. Also,
(1-gs) multiplies the infectious fractions in lm because individuals in
the susceptible class (Sm) are wearing masks. These forces of infection
and appropriate initial conditions complete our model formulation.
The Effective Reproduction Number <eff
The effective reproduction number, <eff, is the average number
of secondary cases produced by a typical infectious individual
Figure 2. Cumulative Number of Cases for N95 Respirator. Without any interventions the number of cumulative cases is shown by the solid
blue line. As expected when the mask is more effective or more people wear a masks, then the number of cumulative cases decreases. Note how
effective the N95 is when only 10% of the population wears a respirator.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g002
Table 6. Effective Reproduction Number, <con: Surgical Masks.
Mask Effectiveness Effective Reproduction Number, <con
Susceptible (gs gs gs gs) Infectious (gi gi gi gi) 10% 25% 50%
gs~0, gi~0 1.83 1.83 1.83
gs~0:02, gi~0:02 1.81 1.81 1.8
gs~0:02, gi~0:05 1.79 1.77 1.77
gs~0:05, gi~0:05 1.79 1.77 1.77
Effective Reproduction Number, <con, for surgical masks. Notice that <con decreases as a higher percentage of people wear masks as well as when masks are more
effective. However, <con is not greatly reduced even when 50% of the population wears masks and masks are 50% effective.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.t006
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intervention strategies are often measured by their ability to
reduce the spread of a disease in a given population. In an
epidemic model the magnitude of the effective reproduction
number, <eff, determines whether or not an epidemic occurs and
its severity [15]. When <effw1, the number of infections grow and
an epidemic occurs, however when <effv1, the number of
infections does not increase and there is no epidemic outbreak
[15].
Without any interventions the model has an initial effective
reproduction number (uncontrolled) <unc given by:
<unc~b
a
v
z
h
mzd
  
ð4Þ
This <unc is the product of the average number of people infected
per unit time b and the weighted sum of the average infectious
period 1=(mzd) plus the average incubation period 1=v.
The ‘next-generation operator’ approach [17] is used to find
an expression for the effective reproduction number (controlled)
<con for our epidemic model when masks are used as an
intervention strategy. The computation is done by linearizing the
system of equations (2) around the disease-free equilibrium (DFE).
The DFE has E, Em, I, and Im equal to zero with S0, S0
m,a n dR0
positive. Since there is no immunity from previous infection or
vaccination R0 is also equal to zero. The resulting four-
dimensional linearized system is of the form
dX
dt
~(F{V)X,
where
X~½EE m II m 
T, ð5Þ
F~
1
s
baS0 (1{gi)baS0 bhS0 (1{gi)bhS0
gsbaS0
m (1{gi)(1{gs)baS0
m (1{gs)bhS0
m (1{gi)(1{gs)bhS0
m
0 000
0 000
2
6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 5
,
V~
QEmzv {QE 00
{QEm QEzv 00
{v 0 QImzdzm {QI
0 {v {QIm QIzdzm
2
6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 5
,
The effective reproduction number <con is the largest eigenvalue
of the matrix FV{1 [17]. Hence <con is the only non-zero
eigenvalue of the matrix FV{1 and is given by the expression:
Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Cases for Surgical Masks. The same pattern that was seen in Figure 2 with respirators is also seen here: as the masks
effectiveness is higher the number of cumulative cases decreases and the number of cases also decreases if a higher percentage of people wear masks.
However, the difference in the number of cumulative cases is not nearly as large when surgical masks are worn; this is due to their lower effectiveness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g003
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1
s(c2c1{QEmQE)(c4c3{QImQI)
  
 ð 6Þ
b((c4c3{QImQI)(((1{gs)S0
ma)(QEz(1{gi)c1)zS0a(c2z(1{gi)QEm)z
hv((c4z(1{gi)QIm)((1{gs)S0
mQEzS0c2)z(QIz(1{gi)c3)((1{gs)S0
mc1zS0QEm)))
where c1~QEmzv, c2~QEzv, c3~QImzdzm, c4~QIzdzm,
and s~S0zS0
m.
We use equations 4 and 7 to define the effective reproduction
number for the model as:
<eff~
<unc 0ƒIzImƒt
<con tvIzIm
 
where t is the threshold number of infected individuals at which
masks start to be used.
Estimation of Parameter Values
The epidemiology of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is not accurately
known since it continues to spread across the world. The parameter
values shown in Table 2 were chosen based on the best available
data. The incubation period for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has been
reportedtobe2–10dayswith ameanof6days[18].The meantime
in the exposed classes E and Em corresponding to the incubation
period has been assumed to be 6 days, making the transfer rate to
the infectious classes, I and Im, constant at v=1/6.
The infectious period is believed to be between four and seven
days, with an average of five days [19,20]. Thus, the baseline value
for the recovery rate is constant at d=1/5. The fatality rate of the
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is thought to be in the range of 0.3%–
1.5%, with a mean of 0.46% [21–23]. The case fatality rate for our
model is m=(dzm), setting this equal to 0.0046 results in
m~0:0046d=0:9954~0:001.
The current estimates on the transmission of pandemic (H1N1)
2009 are that one infected person may typically infects one to two
people [24–26]. The transmissibility, b, is the product of the
susceptibility of the population, the infectivity of the disease, and
the number of contacts an individual has in a day [27,28]. The
susceptibility of the population is set to one, as it is believed few
people are immune to pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and the number of
contacts an individual has per day is assumed to be 16 [29]. The
infectivity is found by 1:8=(16(
a
v
z
h
mzd
)), so that R0 =1.8 in a
completely susceptible population and the infectivity is .0141. So
b~0:23 gives the transmission rate, the fraction of contacts per
day that is sufficient for the transmission of pandemic (H1N1)
2009.
The baseline population size N for the model is set at one
million people and all are initially in the susceptible class S. The
initial infected fraction, I/N, is set at 0.00001 so that when
N=1000000, I=10. The model scales linearly so that the initial
population size N and the initial number of infected individuals I
are both scaled up or down by the same factor. We assume that
individuals will start wearing masks after 100 people are infected,
Figure 4. Sensitivity to <unc <unc. Thenumber of cumulative cases is very sensitive to the value of the uncontrolledeffective reproduction number (<unc ).
Higher values of <unc result in a larger number of cumulative cases. A large difference in the number of cases is seen when the <unc is equal to 1.83 and
when <unc is equal to 1.7; for such a slight difference in <unc the difference in the number of cases is quite large.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g004
(6)
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people to start wearing masks. We analyzed the impact of masks
when 10%, 25%, and 50% of the population wear them.
Using the studies published on the effectiveness of masks we
determined the baseline values for the effectiveness of N95
respirators to be gs =0.2 and gi =0.5 and for the surgical masks
gs =0.02 and gi =0.05 [12]. The effectiveness of masks in
decreasing the infectivity of a sick individual is greater because
the mask contains the virus particles, preventing them from
becoming airborne, and therefore preventing the contamination of
surrounding surfaces as well as people [30].
Although it is possible that some sick individuals may change their
behavior due to the symptoms [15], we assume that sick individuals
will not change their behavior and continue to have the same number
of daily contacts as a healthy individual. Therefore, we set the
baseline value for the reduced number of contacts due to illness h at 1,
as people usually do not greatly alter their daily behavior during the
incubation period. Individuals in the exposed classes, E and Em,a r e
thought to be 50% less infectious due to incubation than those in the
infected classes, I and Im,s ow es e ta=0.5 [19,31].
Results
We analyzed two scenarios: one in which the N95 respirator is
worn and one in which surgical masks are worn; for both types of
masks we considered three different variations in mask effective-
ness. Each case is evaluated with 10%, 25%, and 50% of
susceptible and exposed individuals wearing masks, while in each
case the fraction of infectious individuals wearing masks is slightly
larger. When 10%, 25%, and 50% of susceptible and exposed
individuals are wearing masks the fraction of infectious individuals
wearing masks is 30%, 40%, and 50%, respectively. All
simulations assume that in a population of one million there are
initially 10 infected individuals reported and everyone else is
susceptible. Mask start being used when there have been 100
reported cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
The numerical results for the percentage of pandemic (H1N1)
2009 cases are shown in Table 3 for the N95 respirator and in
Table 4 for surgical masks. The effective reproduction numbers for
each case are shown in Table 5 for N95 respirators and in Table 6
for surgical masks. The cumulative number of pandemic (H1N1)
2009 cases can be seen graphically for the varying mask
effectiveness and the different fractions of individuals wearing
masks in Figure 2 and in Figure 3 for N95 respirators and surgical
masks, respectively.
Table 3 and Table 4 show that when masks are not used, then
the total percentage of the population who will be infected is
74.61% in a population of 1 million people. With the
implementation of N95 respirators Table 3 exhibits a reduction
in the cumulative number of cases of almost 200,000, or a 19%
decrease, when 10% of the population wears masks and they are
20% effective. Table 5 shows the implementation of the N95
Respirators’ impact on the effective reproduction number <con;i t
is reduced from 1.83 to 1.66 when masks are 20% effective in
reducing both susceptibility and infectivity and 10% of the
population is wearing masks. When effectiveness is increased to
50% <con is reduced even further to 1.4. As the fraction of the
population wearing N95 respirators increases, <con is reduced
Figure 5. Sensitivity to the Number of Initial Cases. The model is sensitive to the number of index cases. In a population of one million if the
number of index cases is 10 there are significantly fewer cases than if the number of index cases is 1000 or 10,000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g005
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masks do not have as large of an impact in reducing the
cumulative number of cases as does the N95 respirator. Table 6
displays the effective reproduction number <con when surgical
masks are implemented. The lowest value surgical masks reduce
<con to is 1.77.
In Figure 2 the effectiveness of the N95 respirator in reducing
the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is significant. As the
percentage of the population wearing masks increases the number
of cumulative cases decreases and when the mask effectiveness is
greater, the number of cases is also greatly reduced. The impact of
surgical masks is not as large as seen graphically in Figure 3, the
reduction in the cumulative number of cases is relatively small
compared to that of the N95 respirator. If mask effectiveness is 5%
and 50% of the population wears surgical masks the reduction in
the number of cumulative cases is 6%.
Sensitivity Analysis
Even though the parameter values were estimated from
epidemiological data, there is still some uncertainty in their
values. Since pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is a new virus, there is a wide
range of estimated values for the parameters. In our model we
chose the averages for our baseline parameters, here we look at a
range of parameters and how changing a specific one effects the
outcome of the model. This sensitivity analysis examines the effects
of changes in the reproduction number (<unc), mask effectiveness
(gs and gi), index cases (I=N), fraction of population wearing
masks (Qi), number of initially infected at which masks are
implemented (t), as well as the effect of which epidemiological
group wears masks (S or I). Unless otherwise stated the other
parameters are fixed at their baselines values found in Table 2.
Effective reproduction number. The effective repro-
duction number <unc determines the average number of
secondary cases resulting from one typical infectious individual
during the infectious period without the implementation of
facemasks. Since there is a delay in the implementation of
facemasks the initial growth of the epidemic is affected by <unc.
The estimates of <unc for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vary widely, the
common range is assumed to be between 1.2 and 2.2. As the value
of <unc increases the number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases
increases significantly as shown graphically in Figure 4.
Mask effectiveness. The effectiveness of the mask greatly
affects the number of cumulative cases. The higher the
effectiveness the fewer number of cases (shown in the Results
section). The effectiveness of the masks not only depends upon the
type of mask and quality but also proper usage.
Index cases. The number of initially infected individuals can
have a major impact on the size of the epidemic. In Figure 5 we
vary the number of initially infected individuals in the population.
Fraction of population wearing masks. We consider
variations in the percentage of the population that wears masks.
We look at the effect of 10%, 25% and 50% of the population
wearing masks. The model shows that the higher the percentage of
the population wearing masks the fewer the number of cumulative
cases, this is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Sensitivity to the Percentage of the Population Wearing Masks. The fraction of the population wearing masks greatly affects the
number of cases. Even if only 10% of the population wears masks the number of cumulative cases is significantly reduced; however, the graph shows
that the number of cases is drastically reduced if 25% of people wear masks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g006
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delay in the implementation of masks as seen in Figure 7. We look
at the cumulative number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases for the
N95 respirator when 10% of the population is wearing masks.
Figure 7 shows that the earlier masks are implemented, the bigger
the reduction in the cumulative number of cases.
Who wears masks. The model is sensitive to who wears
masks. Here we look at the effect if only infected individuals wear
masks and if only susceptible and exposed individuals would wear
masks. Figure 8 shows that it is important for both infected, as well
as susceptible and exposed individuals, to wear masks.
Discussion
The standard mitigation strategies used for influenza viruses are
vaccines and antivirals. However, in the case of a novel virus these
may not be readily available and other mitigation strategies will be
needed. As seen during the 2003 SARS outbreak and the current
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 people are willing to wear facemasks to
reduce the spread of disease. We used a mathematical model to
examine the possible impact of N95 respirators and surgical masks
on reducing the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. When modeled
with a low mask effectiveness and a small fraction of the
population wearing masks, the implementation of facemasks still
has a relatively large impact on the size of the pandemic (H1N1)
2009.
The numerical simulation results in the results section show
that without any interventions, we predict that a large
percentage of the population will be infected with pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 influenza strain. This result is not surprising as
the population is 100% susceptible and the effective repro-
duction number <unc is 1.83, which is higher than that of
t y p i c a ls e a s o n a li n f l u e n z a .I nr e a l i t y ,t h eRunc may be lower
due to heterogeneous mixing patterns, pre-existing immunity,
and other interventions in place. With 10% of the population
wearing N95 respirators with effectiveness at 20% in reducing
both susceptibility and infectivity there is a 19% reduction in
the cumulative number of cases. With the same mask
effectiveness but 25% of the population wearing N95
respirators, the total number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases
is reduced by almost 30% and with 50% of the population
wearing masks, it results in over a 36% reduction in the
number of cases.
The effectiveness of surgical masks is low, therefore the impact
of wearing them during an epidemic is not significant. Even at
50% effectiveness in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity
and with 50% of the population wearing surgical masks only a 6%
reduction in the number of cumulative cases is seen.
The sooner an epidemic is recognized and masks are
implemented, the bigger the reduction in the number of cases
will be. As seen in the results section the epidemic is sensitive to
the delay in implementing masks. The difference in the total
number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases when masks are
implemented at 100 infected individuals and 1,000 infected
individuals is over 7%.
The implementation of neither N95 respirators nor surgical
masks lowered the effective reproduction number <unc below
one. However, N95 respirators greatly decreased <unc,i ns o m e
scenarios very close to one. While facemasks will not stop the
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, they could greatly reduce its severity
and allow for more time to develop effective vaccines and
antivirals.
There are currently more trials being conducted on the
effectiveness of surgical masks and N95 respirators [32], which will
Figure 7. Sensitivity to When Masks Are Implemented. Masks should be implemented as soon as possible. There is a large difference in the
number of cases when masks are implemented at 100 infectious individuals versus waiting until there are 1000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018.g007
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must be noted that in order for masks to be effective they must be:
(1) available, (2) affordable, (3) worn properly, (4) replaced or
sanitized daily, and (5) N95 respirators should be fit-tested. Only
10% of the population would have to wear masks in order to reduce
the percentage of cases by 20%. Facemasks are inexpensive,
relatively easy to implement, and would not cause a large economic
burden to society. Masks are a powerful tool and can be used by
countries with limited supplies of antiviral drugs and vaccines. In
addition, economically feasible preventative global mitigations will
benefit the world as a whole. We can conclude from our model that
N95 respirators if worn properly are an effective intervention
strategy in reducing the spread of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
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